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INTRODUCTION

In an article in last Spring's coal issue,' industry lawyers Rosemary Collyer and Michael Klise argued that the Mine Safety and
Health Administration's (MSHA) "laissez faire" approach to the designation of a miners' representative under the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Amendments Act of 1977 (Mine Act)2 conflicted with the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA)3 scheme of exclusive majority
based representation, and that such conflict must be resolved so that
the Mine Act conforms to the "NLRA's framework of exclusive representation. 4 They argue that unless MSHA revises its approach to
employee designation of a walkaround miners' representative, mine
operators will be put in the untenable position of having to comply
with one statute at the peril of violating another.5 The argument presumes that the NLRA is the transcendent federal labor statute to which
all other federal labor statutes must bow.
Under MSHA's regulations, any two employees can designate
someone to carry out the various functions accorded to the representative of miners under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act. 6 Ms.
Collyer and M.r. Klise contend that this approach undermines the
NLRA, which provides that a majority of employees can select a representative who has the right to act as the exclusive agent for collective bargaining purposes, and prohibits an employer from dominating
or interfering with the formation or administration of a labor organiza-

1. Rosemary Collyer & Michael Klise, Rights of Mine Access for Miners' Representatives: Has a Wal, Around the Mine Become a Run Around the Law?, 95 W. VA. L.
REV. 617 (1993).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
801-962 (1988)).
3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)) (also
known as the Wagner Act) was amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (also known as Taft-Hartley), by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act), and by other minor
enactments. References in this article are to the statutory sections of the NLRA, as amended.
4. Collyer & Klise, supra note 1, at 661.
5. Id.
6. 30 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(1) (1993).
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tion.7 Essentially, they assert that in a non-union setting, employees
should be restricted to concerted activities to protect their workplace
safety interests through the designation of a fellow employee, and none
other, as their representative under the Mine Act.
The authors are particularly indignant that under MSHA's rules, an
employer can be required to provide access to its property to a nonemployee union official, who accompanies the federal inspector as the
miners' representative.' It is this attempted use of non-employee union
representatives at non-unionized mines which, they contend, "squarely
presents the conflict between the NLRA's principles of employee free
choice, exclusive representation, and majority rule, and MSHA's inclusive definition of, and procedures for designating, a representative of
miners under the Mine Act."9 They express concern that this approach
jettisons an imagined employer's private property rights under the
NLRA and exposes the company to charges of dealing with a minority
union.
Although Ms. Collyer and Mr. Klise claim to be examining the
interplay of the NLRA and the Mine Act, their discussion selectively
focuses on Section 9 of the NLRA, which grants exclusive bargaining
status to a representative selected by the majority of employees," and
Section 8(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for an employer to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of a labor organiza-

7. Collyer & Klise, supra note 1, at 622.
8. Id. at 634-36.

9. Id. at 654.
10. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988), provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
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tion."t In pursuit of this narrow approach, little attention is given to
the sweeping language of Section 7, which grants employees the right
to engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection.

Furthermore, such activity may be exercised with or without a majority
selected representative, particularly in a non-union setting. 2
As discussed more fully below, the NLRA is not the sole federal
labor statute to which all other federal or state laws must give way.

Rather, it is but one legislative pronouncement, albeit a seminal one
for collective bargaining purposes, in which Congress has guaranteed
certain protections for working men and women. Accordingly, to the
extent that the NLRA is to be viewed in light of the more recently
enacted Mine Safety and Health Act, it must be done in a manner
which accommodates Congressional guarantees of, and concern for, the

rights of miners to most effectively protect their life and limb in the
nation's mines.
Finally, assuming arguendo, that the walkaround rights of miners
and miners' representatives must somehow exist in complete harmony

with the exclusive bargaining principles of the NLRA, a reasoned
study of both statutes reveals that they are, in fact, in harmony, as
presently viewed by their respective federal agencies and the courts.
Accordingly, calls for revision of MSHA's regulations are hollow and
must fail.

11. Section 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988), provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer
mo dominate or interfere with the formation or administratioi of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to
rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of
this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer
with him during working hours without loss of time or pay.
Id.
12. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3).
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II. MINERS' RIGHTS UNDER THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977

Congress recognized the important role of miners in drafting the
1977 Mine Act. In the findings and purpose section of that law, Congress declared that "the existence of unsafe and unhealthful conditions
and practices in the Nation's coal or other mines is a serious impediment to the future growth of the coal or other mining industry and
cannot be tolerated."'13 It further states that "the operators of such
mines with the assistance of the miners have the primary responsibility
to prevent the existence of such conditions and practices in such
14
mines."'
Because the drafters viewed the miners as an important part of the
effort to address the health and safety problems in our nation's mines,
the statute affords certain rights to "the representative of miners."
Thus, Congress determined that the representative of miners must have
the right to obtain "an immediate inspection" when he or she believes
that there is a violation or imminent danger.' 5 The statute provides
that when a federal inspector examines the mine, a miners' representative has the right to go along.' 6 If the operator chooses to contest any
citations, orders, or penalties which17 result from the inspection, it must
notify the representative of miners.
Miners or their representative can notify the Secretary of an intention to contest the issuance, modification, or termination of any withdrawal order or the reasonableness of the length of time set for abatement by a citation, 8 and must be provided an opportunity to participate in hearings concerning challenges to MSHA's enforcement actions. 19 Miners and their representatives can obtain copies of the

13. 30 U.S.C. § 801(d) (1988).
14. 30 U.S.C. § 801(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
15. 30 U.S.C. § 813(g)(1) (1988).

16.
17.
18.
19.

30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (1988).
30 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1988); see also 30 U.S.C. § 819(b) (1988).
30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (1988).
Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1994

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 10

800

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:795

operators' roof control plan.2" To further encourage participation by
miners and their representatives in the enforcement of the Act, the
statute prohibits discharge or any manner of discrimination or interference with the statutory rights of any miner, representative of miners,
or applicant for employment.2 '
Although the statute regularly refers to a representative of miners,
it does not specify who the representative will be or how such representative will be selected. The statute does, however, contemplate that
the representative may be drawn either from the employees' ranks or
from outside their ranks, by expressly providing for pay for an employee representative. The Mine Act states that when the representative
"is also an employee of the operator [he] shall suffer no loss of pay
during the period of his participation in the inspection made under this
subsection. '22
MSHA has further promulgated rules that allow two or more
employees to designate a miners' representative. These rules also provide that the representative can be either an individual or an organization.23 Miners can designate different representatives for different purposes.24

20. 30 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1988).
21. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1988).
22. 30 U.S.C. § 813(0 (1988). The Tenth Circuit, affirming the Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission, has found this language "dispositive" of Congressional intent to
include non-employees among potential miners' representatives. Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Secretary of Labor & UMWA, 897 F.2d 447, 450 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'g Emery Mining
Corp., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 276 (1988). The Court noted that "[b]y creating a subclass of representatives who are entitled to compensation while exercising walkaround rights under section
103(0, Congress clearly recognized that some miners' representatives may be employees of
the operator and some may not." Id. It rejected the employer's argument that miners' understanding and awareness of health and safety matters would not be furthered by allowing
non-employees to act as miners' representatives. The court responded that, quite to the contrary, a UMWA non-employee walkaround representative "may have greater expertise in
health and safety matters than an employee representative," in light of the superior experience and training she or he received through the Union. Id. at 451.
23. 30 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(1) (1993).
24. 30 C.F.R. § 40.2(b) (1993).
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III. THE NLRA MUST BE INTERPRETED TO ACCOMMODATE
RIGHTS GRANTED TO MINERS UNDER THE MINE ACT

It is the duty of the NLRB to construe the National Labor Relations Act so as to accommodate the purposes of other federal laws.
Over fifty years ago, in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 25 the Supreme Court instructed the NLRB to construe the NLRA in a manner
which duly considered other federal statutes, in that case, maritime
laws concerning mutinous criminal conduct. It cautioned that,
[t]he (National Labor Relations) Board has not been commissioned to
effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it
may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives.
Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful
accommodation of one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much
to demand of an administrative body that it undertake this accommodation
without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task. 26

That principle and perspective has since been reaffirmed, and continues
in full force and effect today.'
As these cases indicate, the rights of miners to select a
walkaround representative are not necessarily subservient to the National Labor Relations Act's provisions addressing the exclusivity of a
collective bargaining agent chosen by unit employees pursuant to Section 9(a). Rather, the rights of miners to safety representation were
dictated by Congress with full knowledge of the protections and restrictions of the NLRA. To the extent that an accommodation would
need to be made, the NLRA should yield to the equally important
objectives and provisions of the Mine Act, which addresses immediate,
substantial dangers to miners, and provides protections through

25. 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
26. Id. at 47.
27. See Meyers Indus. II, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137, 1143 (1986) (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892-94 (1984) (explaining that the NLRA's definition of "employee"
is to be construed in a manner compatible with the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988))).
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employees' selection of either an employee or non-employee representative to assist MSHA in its mine inspections.
Given the long history and impact of the National Labor Relations
Act on American industry, it can hardly be thought that Congress
simply overlooked the matter of collective bargaining representation in
passing the Mine Act. To the contrary, one can safely assume that in
light of the limited role played by a walkaround representative, the
distinction between a collective bargaining representative and a
walkaround miners' representative was self evident, and the two were
not to be equated.
Even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that the
Mine Act must accommodate the National Labor Relations Act, a
meaningful review of its pertinent provisions, Section 7, Section 9(a),
and Section 8(a)(2), discloses that the Mine Act's provisions for a
miners' representative to assist in MSHA inspections, and the related
regulations promulgated by the agency, are entirely in harmony with
the NLRA's statutory scheme.
IV. THE DESIGNATION OF A WALKAROUND MINERS'
REPRESENTATIVE UNDER THE MINE ACT DoEs NOT CONFLICT
WIrH THE PRINCIPLES OF EXCLUSIVITY OF REPRESENTATION
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Where two or more miners select a representative, whether an
employee or a non-union employee, such representation cannot even
arguably run afoul of Section 9(a) or Section 8(a)(2) unless that individual has the status, under the NLRA, of a "labor organization," and
the employer is actually or potentially supporting, dominating, or interfering with the representative's role or existence. The safeguards
against such employer activity, and protections extended to employees
to secure their ability to bargain collectively through a majority representative, can oniy be fully understood when analyzed in the context
of the legislative purpose behind these provisions.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA requires that representatives selected as
bargaining agents "shall be exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss3/10
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rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
Section 8(a)(2) provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.' ' 29 The passage of Section 9(a) was a response to employer practices which encouraged multiple unions in a
single bargaining unit, resulting in employee bargaining characterized
by confusion and ineffective representation. By enacting Section 9(a),
Congress intended to stabilize industrial relations, to promote harmony
in the workplace, and to protect employees' ability to bargain meaningfully through a single, majority-supported collective bargaining
representative. 30 Introducing his bill to the Senate, Senator Wagner
explained:
Genuine collective bargaining is the only way to attain equality of bargaining power ....
The greatest obstacles to collective bargaining are employer-dominated
unions, which have multiplied with amazing rapidity since the enactment
of (the National Industrial Recovery Act). Such a union makes a sham of
equal bargaining power ....
[O]nly representatives who. are not subservient to the employer with
whom they deal can act freely in the interest of employees.
For these reasons the very first step toward genuine collective bargaining is the abolition of the employer-dominated union as an agency for
dealing with grievances, labor disputes, wages, rules, or hours of employ3
ment. '

The overriding purpose of Section 9(a) was to ensure that employers
could not maintain a "complacent minority group,, typically a company
32
union, so that no collective agreement might be reached at all."
28. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).

29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
30. Gigliotti Corp. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 583 F. Supp. 396, 401
(E.D. Pa. 1984).
31. 78 Cong. Rec. 3443 (1934); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS Acr OF 1935, at 15-16 (1935). Senator Wagner on S.2926, March 1, 1934
(NLRB 1985), at 15-16, cited in Electromation Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 142 L.R.R.M.
1001, 1005 (1993).
32. 78 Cong. Rec. 3443 (1934); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS Acr OF 1935, at 15-16 (1935). House Report No. 972 on S. 1958 May 21,
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It is Section 8(a)(2) which prevents employer influence over bargaining representatives "to ensure that collective bargaining is truly at
arms length.' 33 To make certain that the "company-dominated union"
would be eliminated, Congress outlawed employer interference with the
right of employees to select their bargaining representatives on the
basis of majority support.34 Senator Wagner explained of Section
8(a)(2):

Nothing in the bill prevents employers from maintaining free and direct
relations with their workers ... .The only prohibition is against the sham

or dummy union which is dominated by the employer, which is supported
by the employer, which cannot change its rules and regulations without his
consent, and which cannot live except by the grace of the employer's
35
whims.

With the passage of Section 8(a)(2), Congress resolved to rid the
American workplace of the bitterness, strife, and industrial instability
that had marked labor relations in the earlier part of this century and
to promote an orderly procedure for collective bargaining.36
In the recent, highly publicized Electromation case,37 the NLRB
made clear that the key to an employer's violation of Section 8(a)(2)
lies not simply in the existence of a representative who speaks for a
minority of employees. It is, rather, the representatives' status as a
1935, Vol. II, p. 2976 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1985). These legislative comments expressly rely on and echo a case decided one year earlier, Matter of Houde Engineering
Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934), in which the NLRB rejected an employer's argument
that it could choose to bargain with a minority union, where the majority of employees had
chosen the United Auto Workers as their collective bargaining representative. The Board
viewed the employer's refusal to recognize the exclusive bargaining rights of the majoritychosen Auto Workers as "calculated to confuse the employees, to make them uncertain
which organization they should from time to time adhere to, and to maintain a permanent
and artificial division in the ranks." Id.
33. NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1983).
34. Id.; NLRB v. Unit Train Coal Sales, Inc., 636 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1980).
35. LEGISLATIVF" HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr OF 1935 (1935);
79 Cong. Rec. 2371-72. Senator Wagner on S.1958, February 21, 1935, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., Vol. I at 1313 (NLRB 1985).
36. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 685 (1944).
37. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 142 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1008-09 (1993).
In that case, the Board condemned employee-staffed "action committees" created by the
employer to address dissatisfaction with work-related issues.
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labor organization or labor representative, within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the NLRA, who is subject to the employer's domination
or interference.38
Section 2(5) broadly defines the term "labor organization" to mean
"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work."39 As the Board recognized in
Electromation, Congress adopted this broad definition to encompass
common forms of company dominated unions that had arisen following
passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act and to offer maximum
protection against employer activity that even tainted independent employee collective bargaining through an exclusive representative.40
Section 2(5) was drafted not to protect employers, but to protect employees against company conduct which frustrated their workers' ability to collectively and meaningfully further work-related interests.41
Viewing both the purpose and the narrowly drawn role of the
miners' walkaround representative against this background, it is clear
that a miners' representative under the Mine Act cannot be equated
with a labor organization under the National Labor Relations Act. The
miners' representative is a creature of the Mine Act and can function
only within the parameters permitted by that statute. The Mine Act
enables the walkaround representative to act under relatively shortterm, limited circumstances: namely, (1) to obtain an immediate inspection when he or she believes there is a violation or imminent
danger; (2) to accompany an MSHA inspector on mine investigations;

38. Employer actions which may constitute support of, or domination or interference
with, a labor organization include suggesting the formation of the organization, creating the
organization, structuring it, articulating by-laws or other principles for its governance, or
selecting its members. See, e.g., Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 477-78 (6th Cir.
1985); Utrad Corp. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 520, 521 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Ampex Corp.,
442 F.2d 82, 84-85 (7th Cir. 1971); North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 38, 47

(1988).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
40. Electromation, Inc., 142 L.R.R.M. at 1005.

41. Id.
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(3) to notify the Secretary of an intention to contest the issuance,
modification, or termination of any withdrawal order or the reasonableness of the length of time set for abatement by a citation; (4) to participate in hearings related to challenges to MSHA's enforcement action; and (5) to obtain copies of the operators' roof control plan. The
miners' representative has no potential to act on matters which relate
to the employees' wages, hours, or other working conditions.42
The miners' representative may be designated exclusively by the
miners themselves. Where miners designate a non-employee, in particular, the potential for employer domination or interference with this
limited representation is virtually non-existent. 41 While statutorily circumscribed contact and communication between the miners' representative and the coal operator may take place, the representative's primary
function is to communicate with, and deal with, MSHA and the employees.
To view the place of the miners' representative in the overall
labor scheme, one must approach the matter with a modicum of common sense. It may be helpful to look to comparable representational
scenarios in an employer-employee setting. For instance, if several
black employees believed that a coal operator was engaged in racial
discrimination and obtained the assistance of a private attorney to
assist them before the EEOC and in their dealings with the employer
over the charges, would that attorney be a "labor organization" with
whom the employer could not deal, for fear of violating Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA? Of course not.
Or, in another example, if several deaf employees believed that
they had not been reasonably accommodated by their company and
sought the assistance of a deaf activist organization in processing
charges under the Americans with Disability Act and in discussing
potential accommodations with their employer, would those activistrepresentatives suddenly become a labor organization? Any such sug-

42. See supra notes 10-18.
43. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor & UMWA, 897 F.2d 447,

452 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that "a non-employee representative is not subject to the same
pressures that can be exerted by an operator on an employee representative.").
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gestion is absurd. Yet it is precisely such a notion that underlies the
argument that an employer engages in a violation of the NLRA when
dealing with a miners' representative under the Mine Act.
A rational analysis of the interplay between the Mine Act's provision for a miners' walkaround representative (and the related MSHA
regulations), and Section 9(a) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, must take into account the limited purpose and role assigned
the miners' representative by Congress and the contrasting purpose and
role of a collective bargaining representative under the NLRA. Viewed
from a more sensible perspective, and one which looks to both the
purpose and the judicial interpretation of these provisions of the
NLRA, it is not surprising that Congress did not feel it necessary to
extend the NLRA-like protections to employees under the Mine Act.
Given the limited purposes for walkaround representation (when contrasted with the established and all-encompassing purposes of collective
bargaining representation), it is self-evident that the ability of the
miners' representative to act promptly and effectively on behalf of the
miners would have been severely diminished, if not obliterated, had
Congress imposed majority support requirements, complete with provisions for campaigning, elections, challenges, and certification, as under
the NLRA. 44 Clearly, Congress did not intend such a result.
V. DESIGNATION OF A MINERS' REPRESENTATIVE
UNDER THE MINE ACT IS CONSISTENT WiTH THE NLRA's
SECTION 7 PROTECTION OF CONCERTED ACTIvrrY

Even assuming, arguendo, that Congress may only create rights
and protection for miners under the Mine Act that are consistent with
the rights and protections created for employees under the National
Labor Relations Act, the Mine Act's provision for employee designa-

44. There are certain distinctions which must be drawn between a miners' walkaround
representative in a non-union setting, where the representation does not have the potential to
conflict with or undermine an exclusive collective bargaining representative or the provisions
of a labor agreement, and a union setting, where the potential for such conflict exists, as
discussed more fully below.
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tion of a miners' representative may easily be "harmonized" with the
scheme of concerted activity provided for under the NLRA.
As a general rule, concerted activities are protected by Section 7
where the activities can reasonably be seen as affecting terms or conditions of employment.45 Thus, "mutual aid and protection" has been
construed to cover a large variety of subjects. In a non-union setting,
these activities have been particularly significant, for they are often the
vehicle for unrepresented employees to assert their rights to wages,
46
hours of employment, and other working conditions.
In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 47 the Supreme Court stressed the expansive nature of activity that fell within the ambit of Section 7's
"mutual aid or protection" language:
The 74th Congress knew well enough that labor's cause often is advanced
on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within
the immediate employment context. It recognized this fact by choosing, as
the language of [section] 7 makes clear, to protect concerted activities for
the somewhat broader purpose of 'mutual aid or protection' as well as for
the narrower purposes of 'self-organization' and 'collective bargaining.'
Thus, it has been held that the 'mutual aid or protection' clause protects
employees from retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve
working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forum, and
that employees' appeals to legislators to protect their interests as employees are within the scope of this clause. To hold that activity of this nature
is entirely unprotected-irrespective of location or the means employed-would leave employees open to retaliation for much legitimate
activity that could improve their lot as employees.48

45. Gatliff Coal Co. v. NLRB, 953 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1992).
46. The basis for "concerted" activity is "joint action" by employees, which generally
requires that two or more employees act together with regard to matters affecting terms and
conditions of employment. In some instances, the action of a single employee may be construed as "concerted" if it is undertaken with the authority of other employees. See Meyers
Ind. II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Meyers case
was first decided in 1984, Meyers Ind., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), rev'd sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985). On remand, the NLRB
issued Myers I.

47. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
48. Id. at 565-67. The activity in question was employees' distribution of a newsletter,
on the employer's property during nonworking time, urging employees to take action against
the state's right-to-work laws and to support the union.
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Protected concerted activity may include employees' invocation of
rights under other labor-related statutes. For example, an employee
who sought the assistance of the Labor Department's Wage and Hour
Division in connection with a holiday pay matter was protected by
Section 7 of the NLRA, where her action was related to group concerns over overtime pay.49 An employee who sought the assistance of
the Department of Labor in connection with her employer's lunch-hour
policy was held to have engaged in protected concerted activity, where
other employees had expressed concern over the matter. 50 Employee
resort to assistance from safety inspectors from the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration has consistently been held protected
concerted activity.5 ' Similarly, employees who have sought assistance
from human rights agencies in connection with workplace discrimination issues are protected under Section 7.52 Not surprisingly, safety
and health-related conditions have historically been in the forefront of
concerns over which employees have banded together for their mutual
aid and protection.53

49. D & D Sewing, D & D Distribution v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1986),
enforcing 277 N.L.R.B. 909 (1985).
50. Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 685 (1987).
51. Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., 1993 NLRB Lexis 397 (ALJ Dec., April
16, 1993) (two employees who sought OSHA inspection of unsafe working conditions were
protected under Section 7); Jay Metals, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 167 (1992) (employee who contacted OSHA and prompted inspection of plant's safety conditions was protected under Section 7); American Poly-Therm Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1990) (two employees who reported
employer's safety violations to OSHA were protected under Section 7).
52. Huizinga Cartage Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 965 (1990) (three employees who filed charges with, and sought assistance from, state department of human rights were protected under
Section 7); M & G Convoy Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1988) (contacting Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and other governmental agencies regarding race discrimination was
protected concerted activity).
53. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984), enforcing 256 N.L.R.B.
451 (1981), rev'g 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982), remanded, 766 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1985)
(refusal to drive a truck employee believed unsafe, and assertion of contractual right not to
do so was protected); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (several
machinists who walked out of their plant to protest lack of heat were protected); NLRB v.
Jasper Seating Co., 857 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1988) (two employees who walked out of nonunion shop to protest drafting conditions protected, even though majority of employees did
not support action); Esco Elevators, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1985) (safety-related complaints were protected); Zurn Indus., Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 632 (1981); Akron'Gen. Medical
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The Board and Courts distinguish between employees who are
unrepresented and those who have chosen an exclusive bargaining
representative in determining the extent to which a minority of employees may act on their own behalf. Activity for "mutual aid and
protection" that is otherwise sheltered by Section 7 may be circumscribed where the employees are represented by a union. In Emporium
54 the SuCapwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,
preme Court affirmed this principle in finding that four employees who
complained of the employer's racial discrimination did not have a
protected right to: (1) refuse union representation under their collective
bargaining agreement; (2) independently demand that management deal
with them directly; and, (3) engage in unauthorized picketing in furtherance of that demand. The Court explained: '
Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the employees elect that course, is the principle of majority rule ....
(citations
omitted) If the majority of a unit chooses union representation, the NLRA
permits it to bargain with its employer to make union membership a condition of employment, thereby imposing its choice upon the minority... .55

Nowhere in the decision did the Court suggest that employees who
had not chosen an exclusive bargaining representative were limited to
concerted activity supported by the majority of the unit. Indeed, where
employers have. made this argument, it has been soundly rejected. In
NLRB v. Jasper Seating Co.,56 two employees, in a non-union factory,
walked off the job after unsuccessfully demanding that a door, which
caused a draft, be shut. The majority of employees felt too hot with
the door shut, and wanted it open. Faced with competing demands
from two groups and the minority walk-out, the 'company fired the
employees who walked out.

Ctr., 232 N.L.R.B. 920 (1977) (complaints about lint and dust in work area were protected);
Gibbs Die Casting Aluminum Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 75 (1969) (complaints of excessive fumes
in plant were protected).
54. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
55. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
56. 857 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1988).
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The employer maintained that the majority rule recognized in
Emporium Capwell should be extended to restrict the right of a minority of its employees, in a non-union setting, from engaging in concerted activity for their mutual aid or protection, except where they had
the support of the majority. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the argument as "nonsense,"57 and replied:
The majority rule of Emporium Capwell derives from the concept of exclusive collective-bargaining representation under Section 9(a) of the Act,
which embodies the notion that, once a majority of employees selects a
bargaining agent, that agent alone is entitled to represent the employees.
Nothing in the Act, however, limits the rights of non-unionized employees
of whether
to engage in concerted conduct for their mutual aid regardless
58
or not their goal is supported by a majority of employees.

The Board and Circuit Courts have repeatedly recognized that Emporium Capwell holds only that certain concerted activities may lose their
protected character when they conflict with or undermine a union's
status as exclusive bargaining representative.5 9 This limited qualification of Section 7 is consistent with the legislative purpose of Section
60

9(a).

57. Id. at 421.
58. Id. at 421-22 (emphasis added).
59. Richardson Paint Co. v. NLRB, 574 F.2d 1195, 1206 (5th Cir. 1978); Dreis &
Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1976). It should be noted, however, that where minority employee action for mutual aid and protection does not conflict with
or impair the union's ability to represent the bargaining unit, it may be protected under
Section 7. Thus even the presence of an exclusive bargaining agent will not entirely extinguish the right of a minority group of employees to act in concert to affect their conditions of employment. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bridgeport Ambulance Serv., 966 F.2d 725, 729
(2d Cir. 1992), enforcing 302 N.L.R.B. 58 (1991) ("[A]Ithough-by virtue of the provision
of section 9(a)-employees' attempts to bargain directly with their employer when they have
a union representative are not protected activities under the Act (citing Emporium
Capwelt) . . . not all . . . concerted activity is outside the protection of the Act."); Frank

Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981) (unionized employee was protected
under Section 7 from employer retaliation for filing a racial discrimination charge with
EEOC); NLRB v. A. Lasaponara & Sons, Inc., 541 F.2d 992, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1976) (no
evidence that strikers were at odds with or attempting to by-pass their union); NLRB v.
Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1970) ("We do not hold that there
cannot be circumstances in which an employee or a minority group of employees may
engage, without reference of the matter to union processes, in action which is protected
under Section 7 though there is an agreement in force or in the process of negotiation.").
60. As Senator Wagner explained, in commenting on Section 9(a) during the legis-
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In analyzing the right of a minority of miners to designate a representative under the Mine Act against this NLRA backdrop, two principles clearly emerge. In a non-union setting, that right would be protected by the "mutual aid and protection" provision of Section 7 of the
NLRA, and there is no requirement, in the statute or caselaw, which
supports the notion that the representative requires majority support.
In a union setting, however, Section 9(a) would circumscribe the
ability of bargaining unit miners to bypass the safety representatives
under the collective bargaining agreement and designate an independent
miners' representative. This is particularly true at a mine represented
by the United Mine Workers. Article III of the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement expressly addresses health and safety, including
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act,6 ' union access to the mine
for safety purposes, 62 labor-management cooperation in the develop-64
63
ment of mining plans, preservation of individual safety rights,
and the establishment and function of a mine health and safety committee. 65 In light of the bargaining unit's choice of a Section 9(a)
exclusive bargaining representative to represent them in matters related
to health and safety under the Mine Act, Emporium Capwell and subsequent caselaw indicate that minority representation under the Mine
Act would not be permitted under the NLRA in a unionized setting.

lative debates:

The language of Section 9(a) . . . makes it clear that the guaranty of the right of
employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
must not be misapplied so as to permit employers to interfere with the practical
effectuation of that right by bargaining with individuals or minority groups in their
own behalf after representatives have been picked by the majority to represent all.
Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, Statement by Senator Robert
F. Wagner concerning H.R. 6288, March 13, 1935, Vol II, p. 2490 (NLRB, 1935) (emphasis added).
61. See National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1993, Article III, Section (b).
62. Id. § (e).

63. Id. § (h).
64. Id. § (i).
65. Id. § (d).
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VI. THE NLRA DOES NOT PROHIBIT A NON-EMPLOYEE MINERS'
REPRESENTATIVE FROM ACCESS TO A COAL OPERATORS' PROPERTY

FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSES PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE MINE ACT

In determining whether an individual employee in a non-union
workplace is entitled to representation in dealing with the employer in
work-related matters, the National Labor Relations Board engages in a
balancing act. It has found that the "mutual aid and protection" language of Section 7 may be interpreted to allow an employer to deny
an unrepresented employee's request for a representative at a disciplinary hearing. 66 In so doing, the Board has attempted to strike a "fair
and reasoned balance" between the constraints that such a request
would place on the employer in an unorganized setting and the benefit
to the employee if such a representative were present and has determined that the balance tips in favor of the employer. 67
A balancing test also determines whether a non-employee union
representative may have access to the private property of a non-union
employer. In NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox, 68 the Supreme Court lim-

ited the right of union organizers to enter company property for the
purpose of distributing literature to organize the workforce by balancing the union's interest in reaching employees on company property

against the employer's interest in barring non-employee access to its
private property. The union's ability to reach employees through other
available channels weighed heavily in the decision. The employer's
refusal to allow union access was upheld because the balance in those
circumstances tipped in the company's favor, and more importantly,
because the employer's bar against union access did not discriminate
against the union by allowing other non-employee distribution.69
66. E.I. Dupont & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988), on remand from 733 F.2d 296 (3d
Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 628-29. The unorganized employees' request for a representative at a disciplinary hearing is still protected under Section 7, however, and may be granted by the
employer. The employer is simply not required to do so. Even where the request is denied,
the employer may not retaliate against the employee for making the demand. Slaughter v.
NLRB, 876 F.2d at 12 n.2.
68. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
69. In the more recent case of Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), the
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Just as this balancing act allows an employer to deny non-employee union representatives from gaining access to its property in most
organizing cases, it also allows the scales to tip in the employees'
favor in other circumstances, particularly in the area of safety, as illustrated by Hercules, Inc. v. NLRB. 70 In that case, a unionized employer denied a non-employee union representative access to its property
after an explosion took place resulting in a death, arguing that the
representative had no right to violate the company's private property
rights and claiming a proprietary interest in the information the representative sought. The plant manufactured explosive chemicals under a
highly secretive and competitive processing formula. The Board balanced the right of the employees to obtain information, through their
representative, on "the gravest of matters imaginable to the employees
it represents, namely, the cause and prevention of occupational injuries
and work-related deaths . . " against the company's private property
71
interests.
Applying the Supreme Court's Babcock & Wilcox balancing test
enunciated in the Hercules case, the Board rejected the notion that the
employer's interests in its property rights alone outweighed the
employees' substantial interest in obtaining information related to the
explosion.72 It distinguished the interest of the union representative
asserted in the Babcock & Wilcox case, which focused on the goal of
organizing employees and the alternatives available to achieve it, with
the safety interests where access to the property itself was critical.73

Supreme Court reaffirmed the Babcock and Wilcox decision in another union organizing
case. Significantly, in Lechmere, the employer's policy denied all non-employee access to
company property for purposes of solicitation or distribution.
70. 833 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1987), enforcing 281 N.L.R.B. 961 (1986).
71. 281 N.L.R.3. at 969.
72. Id. at 970.
73. Id. The Board relied on an earlier case, NLRB v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 778
F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985), enforcing 273 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1985), presenting similar facts, in
which it had balanced the private property interests of the employer and the employees
interests in representation in critical safety issues and reached the same conclusion. In the
Hercules case, however, the Board accommodated the employer's concerns by requiring the
union to sign a trade secret agreement protecting the company's proprietary interest. 281
N.L.R.B. at 972.
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As the Hercules case makes clear, employer property rights, when
viewed from an NLRA perspective, are not sacred and may very well
give way to a non-employee representative's access to the property to
further the interests of employees in health and safety related matters.
Within this framework, the Mine Act does not infringe on a
company's private property rights (as developed under the NLRA) by
providing a miners' representative "an opportunity to accompany the
Secretary ... during the physical inspection of any coal or other
mine."7 4 Nor does the statute conflict with the National Labor Relations Act in anticipating that a miners' representative might be a nonemployee.75
Indeed, the cases indicate that when the question of access of a
non-employee miners' representative is analyzed under the NLRA
alone, the Board and the courts will favor the interests of the employees in the area of occupational health and safety. This outcome has
been strongly foreshadowed in the recent Supreme Court case brought
under the Mine Act, Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,76 in which the
coal operator argued that its employees' designation of a non-employee
UMWA representative at its non-union mine violated the company's
right to exclude non-employee union representatives from its property
under the NLRA. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, cautioning
that nothing in the NLRA or the cases interpreting that statute expressly protected employer private property rights from non-employee union
intrusion:
[P]etitioner appears to misconstrue Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB .... The
right of employers to exclude union organizers from their private property
emanates from state common law, and while this right is not superseded
by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it. To the contrary,
this Court consistently has maintained that the NLRA may entitle union
employees to obtain access to an employer's property under limited circumstances. See, id., at 112 S. Ct. at 845; NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112, 76 S. Ct. 679, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956). Moreover,

74. 30 U.S.C. § 318(f) (1988).
75. See supra note 19.
76. 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994). The primary issue before the Supreme Court in that case
was the federal district court's jurisdiction over pre-enforcement challenges to orders of the
Mine Safety and Health Administration.
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in a related context, the Court has held that Congress' interest in regulating the mining industry may justify limiting the private property interests
of mine operators. See, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S. Ct.
2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (unannounced Mine Act inspections do not
violate the Fourth Amendment).7"

Thus nothing in the NLRA compels the conclusion that non-employee representatives, including union organizers, are absolutely barred
from employer property. To the contrary, there is no such bar, but
only a balancing test which may, in some instances, weigh more
heavily in favor of an employer's common law property rights and less
heavily in favor of employees' rights to engage in mutual aid or protection. As Thunder Basin and the NLRA cases themselves indicate,
where questions of miners' safety and health arise, it is unlikely that
the NLRB or the courts will find that the employer's property rights
overcome the rights of miners to achieve effective representation that
may make the difference between life or death, safety or disability.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The National Labor Relations Act and the Mine Safety and Health
Act are distinct federal labor statutes which, for the most part, serve
different purposes. In enacting the NLRA, Congress responded to
employers' interference with their employees' right to organize and
bargain collectively and sought to protect employee attempts to represent themselves on the vast array of subjects related to wages, hours
and working conditions.78 To that end, Congress established a detailed
scheme for exclusive representation in collective bargaining, including
provision for both protected and unlawful conducted related thereto,79
as well as an elaborate design for the election of such representatives,
complete with administrative hearings to determine appropriate units

77. Id. at 781 n.21. In Kerr-McGree Coal Corp., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 352 (1993), aff'g
13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1889 (ALJ 1991), Kerr-McGree was similarly unsuccessful in arguing that

Lechmere stands for the proposition that a union member may not be designated as a
miners' representative at a non-union mine. The Commission took note of the limited access
the union member was permitted under Section 103(0 of the Mine Act. Slip op. at 10.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
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for collective bargaining, the presence or absence of majority support,
and the filing of challenges to the Board's representative certification
of a labor organization.8°
In enacting the Mine Safety and Health Act, Congress's purpose
was far more limited. The statute addressed the "urgent need to provide more effective means and measures for improving the working
conditions and practices in the national's coal and other mines in order
To that end,
to prevent death and serious physical harm . *..."81
Congress provided mechanisms to protect miners' health and safety, including mining employees' designation of a "walkaround" representaagent, but simply to pertive, not to serve as a collective bargaining 82
statute.
the
by
allowed
tasks
form the limited
Thus, a miners' representative under the Mine Act is not the
equivalent of a labor organization under Section 2(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act. Although there are scenarios in which a miner
representative could be dominated or interfered with by a coal company, it is particularly unlikely to occur where the miners designate a
non-employee, as the Tenth Circuit noted in Utah Power & Light
Co. 83 Given the plain language of the Mine Act, which contemplates
both employees and non-employees as potential miners' representatives
under Section 103(f) of the Mine Act,84 there is no basis for denying
a non-employee representative access to the mine for walkaround purposes. Similarly, it would constitute a blatant violation of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act for a coal operator to provide access to a non-union non-employee representative, while denying
access to a union member non-employee representative.85
Although the viability of the Mine Act does not depend on its
ability to pass muster under the National Labor Relations Act, the
cases cited herein clearly show that the right of employees to designate

80. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988).

81. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1988).
82. See supra notes 15-23.
83. See supra note 37.

84. 30 C.F.R. § 40.2(b) (1993).
85. Great Scot, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1992); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 308 N.L.R.B.
277 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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a mine representative is wholly consistent with the protections the
NLRA extended to employees' concerted activities under Section 7. In
a non-union setting, there is no conflict between the Mine Act and the
exclusive representation principles of the NLRA. And in a unionized
setting, that designation will effectively have been made through the
employees' choice of a labor organization empowered to engage in the
activities of a mine representative.
The two statutes coexist in harmony. To alter the Mine Act or its
regulations so that a mine representative could only be selected from
employee ranks and only exist with majority support, would undermine
the purposes of the Mine Act for no purpose, while adding nothing to
the protection provided to employees under the National Labor Relations Act. The scheme established by Congress is a sound one and
requires no adjustment.
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